

he also wrote on such famous topics of logic as inference-for-the-self and inference-for-others, the fallacies of the thesis, cause, homogeneous example and heterogeneous example and the resultant of the organ of knowledge.

The other work of *Siddhasena*, *Sanmati prakaraṇa*, describes the partial view point, knowledge and indeterminate intuition and the different schools from the point of view of non-absolutism. The inclusion of different non-Jaina schools in different partial view points was first initiated by *Siddhasena*<sup>1</sup> (Cf. *Text* 2—11).

*Samantabhadra* in his *Āptamīmāṃsā* has laid emphasis on non-absolutism and seven-fold statements. His definition of organ of knowledge is very much similar to that of our *Text* (1. 1).<sup>2</sup> The main emphasis of *Samantabhadra* has been to show the irrelevance of absolutism. In this description he has shown the irrationality of the non-Jaina system as also the possibility of reconciliation of contradictory view points. Another important work from our point of view is the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya* of *Jinabhadra Gaṇi* who flourished from 484-588 A.D.<sup>3</sup> Much of the description of 5 types of knowledge in our *Text* is nothing but a summary of the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya bhṛhadvṛtti*. Similarly the portion on partial point of view is also influenced by it.

Another author who laid down the foundation of a regular system of Jaina logic was *Akalaṅka* who has been placed in about 760 A.D.<sup>4</sup> *Akalaṅka* has the same place in the Jaina philosophy as *Dinnāga* and *Dharmakīrti* in the Buddhist philosophy. *Akalaṅka*'s influence on our *author* is seen specially in the description of partial point of view. It is also to be noted that the division of our *Text* into three chapters—organ of knowledge, partial point of view and symbols—is also taken from *Akalaṅka*'s *Laghiyastrayī*. After *Akalaṅka* came *Vidyānanda* who commented upon both—*Samantabhadra* and *Akalaṅka*. His influence on our *Text* is clear on the chapter on partial point of view. He has been placed in the 9th century A.D.<sup>5</sup>

1. *Sanmati prakaraṇa*, 3.47-49.

2. *Svayambhūstotra*, 63.

3. *Vidyābhūṣana Satisacandra*, History of Indian Logic, p. 181.

4. *Ibid*, p. 185.

5. *Vidyābhūṣana*, S. C., A History of Indian Logic, p. 186.

*Ācārya Māṅikyanandī* who wrote *Parīkṣāmukha*, a standard Text book on *Jaina* logic, came after *Akalaṅka* and is placed in 10th century A.D.<sup>1</sup> *Anantavīrya* who wrote *Prameyaratna-mālā*, a commentary on *Parīkṣāmukha*, says that he churned the nectar of Logic—out of the ocean of the speech of *Akalaṅka*.<sup>2</sup> The book is divided into six chapters. In the first chapter the division of *Pramāṇa* has been given in the same way as in our *Text* (1.24). The definition of inference of our *Text* (1.34) has been directly taken from *Parīkṣāmukha*.<sup>3</sup> *Māṅikyanandī* has given like our *Text* many subdivisions of cause. He writes a different chapter on fallacy giving examples of fallacies of eight types of organs of knowledge. Our *Text* has followed *Akalaṅka* in dividing his chapter whereas in style it comes nearer to the *Sūtra* style of *Parīkṣāmukha*.

*Māṅikyanandī* is followed by great commentators *Prabhācandra* (11th century A.D.)<sup>5</sup> who wrote *Prameyakalamāmartaṅda* ] on *Parīkṣāmukha* and *Nyāyakumudacandra* on *Laghiyastrayī*. These commentaries are very voluminous and deal with the non-*Jaina* systems in detail. Our *author* has a limited purpose of presenting *Jaina* logic in concise form in the new terminology of neo-logic and, therefore, he could not make much use of these commentaries in his work. Similarly the influence of the voluminous commentary (1000 A.D.) of *Abhayadeva Sūri* on *Sanmati Tarka* is also negligible.

The greatest influence on our *Text* is, however, that of *Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra* of *Deva Sūri* (1086-1159 A.D.)<sup>6</sup> Our *Text* can, in fact, be said to be just a recast of this work. It may be argued that if it is so, our *author* cannot be said to be an original thinker. I would like to reproduce the words of Dr. Satakari Mookerjee in this connection. "As regards the originality of thought which is so highly praised in Europe and in the modern universities of India, our ancient writers did not set an inordinate value on it. It was as much a matter of

1. *Sāstri Kailāśacandra, Jaina Nyāya* p. 38.

2. अकलङ्कवचोऽभोधेरुद्धे येन धीमता । न्यायविद्यामूलं तस्मै नमो माणिक्यनन्दिने ॥  
—*Prameyaratna-mālā*, 2.

3. *Sūtra* 9.

4. *Sāstri, Kailāśa Chandra, Jaina Nyāya*, p. 39.

5. *Vidyābhūṣana, S. C., A History of Indian Logic*, p. 198.

minor importance with them as originality of verbal expression. A serious work of philosophical topic did not hold an isolated position in India. It was rather a link in the expanding chain of philosophical speculation. And what was the object of serious concern was fidelity to the fundamentals of the schools and originality was more or less suspect with adherence of the system as rather furnishing a pit for error and misconception. We must not, therefore, expect either originality of expression or of thought in the sense of abrupt departure from the fundamental tenets which give the school a stamp of the distinctive individuality."<sup>1</sup>

*Deva Sūri* also wrote an auto-commentary *Syādvāda-ratnākara* on *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālāṅkāra*. The influence of *Deva Sūri's* word on *Jaina-Tarka bhāṣā* can be very well known by looking at the footnotes of this work edited by *Pandit Sukha Lal Ji*.

Except some other minor *Jaina* logicians who preceded *Yaśovijaya* mention may be made of *Hemacandra Sūri* and *Harihadrā Sūri*. Hemacandrasūri's work *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* (1088-1177 A.D.)<sup>2</sup> has been very ably commented upon by *Pandita Sukhalalji* and translated by *Satakari Mookerjee*. *Haribhadra Sūri* (about 1120 A.D.)<sup>3</sup> is said to have written 140 works. He is said to have written a commentary on *Anekānta Jayapatākā*. Mention may also be made of *Dharmabhūṣana* (1600 A.D.)<sup>4</sup> who is the author of *Nyāyadīpikā* and has been mentioned by name in our *Text* (1.33. L.25).

And lastly comes our author *Yaśovijaya Gaṇi* (1608-1688 A.D.)<sup>5</sup> whose date and life history can be fortunately known from *Sujaśavelibhāsa*, a work written in ancient *Gujarati* by his contemporary *Kāntivijaya Gaṇi*. He was born in *Kanodum* near *Kalola* in *Gujarata* and died at *Dabhoi* in 1688 A.D. His father's name was *Nārāyaṇa* and mother's name was *Sobhagade*. He was a disciple of *Naya Vijaya* who was third in line to *Harivijaya* (1526-1595 A.D) who was contemporary of *Moghul*

1. *Mookerjee Satakari*, Preface, *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā*, p. X.

2. *Vidyā bhūṣana* S. C.. A History of Indian Logic, p. 205.

3. *Ibid*, p. 208.

4. *Ibid*, p. 215.

5. *Ibid*, p. 217.

Emperor, Akbar. *Hari Vijaya's* disciple was *Kalyāna Vijaya*. *Kalyāna Vijaya's* disciple was *Lābhavijaya*. And *Yaśovijaya's* teacher *Naya Vijaya* was the disciple of *Lābhavijaya*. A businessman, *Dhanaji Suri*, sent *Yaśovijaya* to *Kāśi* for higher studies in 1626 A.D. He made a special study of logic there and got the titles of *Nyāya Viśārada* and *Nyāyācārya*.<sup>1</sup> He himself says that he has written one hundred works. A list of seventy-two works of *Yaśovijaya* has been given by Pandit *Sukhalal Ji*. Forty of these works are fully available, seven works are partly available and twentyfive works are not available at all. Out of these works written by *Yaśovijaya*, it would be noticed that sixteen works are on Jaina logic, out of which only eight are available today. Out of these *Nayarahasya* has been referred to in our text also (p. 29.6.8). Out of the remaining works, *Nyāya-khaṇḍa-khādyā* is written on the style of *Khaṇḍana khaṇḍa khādyā* and *Aṣṭasāhasrī vṛtti* is a gloss on the *Aṣṭasāhasrī* of *Vidyānanda*. *Nyāyakhaṇḍakhādyā* deals with soul, emancipation, momentariness, origination, destruction, non-absolutism, class and individual, space and time, determinant concomitant and determinate concomitant etc. It mentions amongst others, *Samantabhadra*, *Gandhahastī*, *Sammati*, *Miśra*, *Bhaṭṭa*, *Śrīdhara*, *Udayana*, *Nārāyaṇācārya*, *Śiromaṇi*, *Dīdhiti-kāra Vardhamāna*, and *Guṇānanda*. Similarly *Aṣṭasāhasrī-vivaraṇa* mentions *Vācaspati*, *Maṇḍana Miśra*, *Prajñākara*, *Hemacandra*, *Vākka-kravartī*, *Vedānti-paśu*, *Kusumāñjali*, *Gurumata*, *Murāribhaṭṭa*, *Murāri*, *Miśra*, *Gautamīya*, *Bhaṭṭācārya*, *Jarannaiyāyika*, *Raghudeva Bhaṭṭācārya*, *Bhūṣaṇasāra* etc. This shows the comparative and critical outlook of *Yaśovijaya*. It is remarkable that he wrote not only on *Aṣṭasāhasrī* which is a work by a *Digambara* author, who has been criticised in our text also (1.2), but also commented upon a non-Jaina work, *Yogasūtra* of *Patañjali*. This indicates his non-sectarian approach. Another work is *Nyāyāloka*, whose contents are given as follows by *Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa* : soul, emancipation, inference, testimony, direct knowledge, indirect knowledge, validity of internal things, inherence, negation, ether, substance, etc.<sup>3</sup> This work also refers

1. *Jaina Tarka-Bhāṣā*, p. 30. verse 4.

2. *Vidyābhūṣaṇa S. C. A History of Indian logic*, p. 220.

3. *Ibid*, p, 219.

to many *Jaina* and *non-Jaina* works.<sup>1</sup>

Coming to *Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā* we have already noted above that it takes its scheme from *Akalaṅka*. The title of this book is common with the work of the same name of *Mokṣākara* and *Keśava Miśra*. The *Buddhist-Tarka-Bhāṣā* of *Mokṣākara* is divided in chapters. The names of the three chapters in *Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā* are, as already indicated, taken from *Laghīyastrayī* of *Akalaṅka*, but the last chapter on symbol does not follow *Laghīyastrayī* but the *Śvetāmbara* tradition as given in the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Bhāṣya*. As regards the work of logic, two works — *Nyāyakusumāñjali* the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*—have been made use of.

I have separately assessed the value of those portions of *Jaina-Tarka-Bhāṣā*, where Yaśovijaya has contradicted the view points of his opponent.<sup>2</sup> My conclusion is this that *Yaśovijaya* has mastered not only the *Jaina* work but also the *non-Jaina* works. His representation of the view points of his opponents is honest and faithful. His view point is objective and his style is distinctively his own. His method is direct, and he does not believe in pedantry. While summarising, he leaves the non-essential and concentrates on the essentials. At places he has shown his originality also, even though his aim was to write a handy text book for beginners. As an instance, we may refer to the *Text* where validity of recollection has been established (1-24). At places we also find that in his zeal to summarise, he has not only made his work too difficult but also neglected the essential part of the original work from which he was summarising.

With these words I invite my readers to go through the work. I have tried to be as authentic as possible in my translation and notes and I do hope that the book, though small in volume, would prove a safe guide for the beginners and a study of this book alone would serve as a good introduction to other higher works of *Jaina* logic.

Dayanand Bhargava

1. *Vidyābhūṣana*, S. C. History of Indian logic, p. 219.
2. Journal of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Delhi, Vol. 1. No. 1, December, 1971.

# ॥ जैन तर्क भाषा ॥

## १. प्रमाणपरिच्छेदः ।

ऐन्द्रवृन्दनतं नत्वा जिनं तत्त्वार्थदेशिनम् ।  
प्रमाणानयनिक्षेपैस्तर्कभाषां तनोम्यहम् ॥

[ १. प्रमाणसामान्यस्य लक्षणनिरूपणम् । ]

§ १. तत्र-स्वपरव्यवसायि ज्ञानं प्रमाणम्-स्वम् आत्मा ज्ञानस्यैव स्वरूपमित्यर्थः, परः तस्मादन्योऽर्थ इति यावत्, तौ व्यवस्यति यथास्थितत्वेन निश्चिनोतीत्ये- 5  
वंशीलं स्वपरव्यवसायि । अत्र दर्शनेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय ज्ञानपदम् । संशयविपर्ययान-  
ध्यवसायेषु तद्वारणाय व्यवसायिपदम् । परोक्षबुद्ध्यादिवादिनां मीमांसकादीनाम्,  
बाह्यार्थापलापिनां ज्ञानाद्यद्वैतवादिनां च मतनिरासाय स्वपरेति स्वरूपविशेषणार्थमुक्तम् ।  
ननु यद्येवं सम्यग्ज्ञानमेव प्रमाणमिष्यते तदा किमन्यत् तत्फलं वाच्यमिति चेत् ;  
सत्यम् ; स्वार्थव्यवसितेरेव तत्फलत्वात् । नन्वेवं प्रमाणे स्वपरव्यवसायित्वं न स्यात्, 10  
प्रमाणस्य परव्यवसायित्वात् फलस्य च स्वव्यवसायित्वादिति चेत् ; न ; प्रमाण-फलयोः  
कथञ्चिदभेदेन तदुपपत्तेः । इत्थं चात्मव्यापाररूपमुपयोगेन्द्रियमेव प्रमाणमिति स्थितम् ;  
न ह्यव्यापृत आत्मा स्पर्शादिप्रकाशको भवति, निर्व्यापारेण कारकेण क्रियाजननायो-  
गात्, मसृणत्लिकादिसन्निकर्षेण सुषुप्तस्यापि तत्प्रसङ्गाच्च ।

§ २. केचित्तु-

“ततोऽर्थग्रहणाकारा शक्तिर्ज्ञानमिहात्मनः

करणत्वेन निर्दिष्टा न विरुद्धा कथञ्चन ॥ १ ॥”

[ तत्त्वार्थश्लोकवा० १.१.२२ ]

15

इति-लब्धीन्द्रियमेवार्थग्रहणशक्तिलक्षणं प्रमाणं सङ्गिरन्ते; तदपेशलम् ; उपयोगात्मना